The majority of First Order methods for large-scale convex-concave saddle point problems and variational inequalities with monotone operators are proximal algorithms which at every iteration need to minimize over problem's domain X the sum of a linear form and a strongly convex function. To make such an algorithm practical, X should be proximal-friendly -admit a strongly convex function with easy to minimize linear perturbations. As a byproduct, X admits a computationally cheap Linear Minimization Oracle (LMO) capable to minimize over X linear forms. There are, however, important situations where a cheap LMO indeed is available, but X is not proximal-friendly, which motivates search for algorithms based solely on LMO. For smooth convex minimization, there exists a classical LMO-based algorithm -Conditional Gradient. In contrast, known to us LMO-based techniques for other problems with convex structure (nonsmooth convex minimization, convex-concave saddle point problems, even as simple as bilinear ones, and variational inequalities with monotone operators, even as simple as affine) are quite recent and utilize common approach based on Fenchel-type representations of the associated objectives/vector fields. The goal of this paper is to develop an alternative (and seemingly much simpler) decomposition LMO-based techniques for bilinear saddle point problems and for variational inequalities with affine monotone operators.
Introduction
This paper is a follow-up to our paper [17] and, same as its predecessor, is motivated by the desire to develop first order algorithms for solving convex-concave saddle point problem (or variational inequality with monotone operator) on a convex domain X represented by Linear Minimization Oracle (LMO) capable to minimize over X, at a reasonably low cost, any linear function. "LMO-representability" of a convex domain X is an essentially weaker assumption than "proximal friendliness" of X (possibility to minimize over X, at a reasonably low cost, any linear perturbation of a properly selected strongly convex function) underlying the vast majority of known first order algorithms. There are important applications giving rise to LMO-represented domains which are not proximal friendly, most notably As we shall see, our decomposition approach can, in principle, handle general convex-concave SP's and affine VI's. Our emphasis in this paper is, however, on bilinear SP's and on VI's with affine operators -the cases which, on one hand, are of primary importance in numerous applications, and, on the other hand, are the cases where our approach is easy to implement and where this approach seems to be more flexible and much simpler than the machinery of Fenchel-type representations developed in [17] (and in fact even covers this machinery, see section 3.3).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In sections 2 and 3 we present our decompositionbased approach to SP problems, resp., VI's with monotone operators, with emphasis on utilizing the approach to handle bilinear SP's, resp., affine VI's, on LMO-represented domains. We illustrate our constructions by applying them to Colonel Blotto type matrix game (section 2.6.3) and Nash Equilibrium with pairwise interactions (section 3.2.2); in both these illustrations, decomposition allows to overcome difficulties coming from potentially huge ambient dimensions of the problems. Proofs missing in the main body of the paper are relegated to Appendix.
Decomposition of Convex-Concave Saddle Point Problems

Situation
In this section, we focus on the situation as follows. Given are 1. convex compact sets X i in Euclidean spaces X i and convex compact sets Y i in Euclidean spaces Y i , i = 1, 2;
2. convex compact sets X, Y such that
such that the projections of X onto X i are the sets X i , and projections of Y onto Y i are the sets Y i , i = 1, 2. For x 1 ∈ X 1 , we set X 2 [ 
which is convex in x ∈ X, and concave in y ∈ Y .
We call the outlined situation a direct product one, when X = X 1 × X 2 and Y = Y 1 × Y 2 .
Induced convex-concave functions
We associate with Φ primal and dual induced functions:
φ(x 1 , y 1 ) := min Φ(x 1 , x 2 ; y 1 , y 2 ) :
ψ(x 2 , y 2 ) := min
Φ(x 1 , x 2 ; y 1 , y 2 ) = max
Φ(x 1 , x 2 ; y 1 , y 2 ) : X 2 × Y 2 → R.
(the equalities are due to the convexity-concavity and continuity of Φ and convexity and compactness of 
and wheneverx = [x 1 ;x 2 ] ∈ X andȳ = [ȳ 1 ;ȳ 2 ] ∈ Y , one has
The strategy for solving SP problems we intend to develop is as follows: 1. We represent the SP problem of interest as the dual SP problem
induced by master SP problem
The master SP problem is built in such a way that the associated primal SP problem
admits First Order oracle and can be solved by a traditional First Order method (e.g., a proximal one).
2. We solve (P ) to a desired accuracy by First Order algorithm producing accuracy certificates [19] and use these certificates to recover approximate solution of required accuracy to the problem of interest.
We shall see that the outlined strategy (originating from [3] 1 ) can be easily implemented when the problem of interest is a bilinear SP on the direct product of two LMO-represented domains.
1 in hindsight, a special case of this strategy was used in [10, 11] .
Regular sub-and supergradients
Implementing the outlined strategy requires some "agreement" between the first order information of the master and the induced SP's, and this is the issue we address now.
. In this situation we say that (x = [x 1 ;x 2 ],ȳ = [ȳ 1 ;ȳ 2 ]) belongs to the saddle point frontier of Φ, and we denote this frontier by S. Let nowz = (x = [x 1 ;x 2 ],ȳ = [ȳ 1 ;ȳ 2 ]) ∈ S, so that the function Φ(x 1 , x 2 ;ȳ 1 ,ȳ 2 ) attains its minimum over x 2 ∈ X 2 [x 1 ] atx 2 , and the function Φ(x 1 ,x 2 ;ȳ 1 , y 2 ) attains its maximum over y 2 ∈ Y 2 [ȳ 1 ] atȳ 2 . Consider a subgradient G of Φ(·;ȳ 1 ,ȳ 2 ) taken atx along X: G ∈ ∂ x Φ(x;ȳ). We say that G is a regular subgradient of Φ atz, if for some g ∈ E 1 it holds
every g satisfying this relation is called compatible with G. Similarly, we say that a supergradient H of Φ(x; ·), taken atȳ along Y is a regular supergradient of Φ atz, if for some h ∈ F 1 it holds
and every h satisfying this relation will be called compatible with H.
, meaning that we are in the direct product case. If Φ(x;ȳ) is differentiable in x at x =x, the partial gradient ∇ x Φ(x;ȳ) is a regular subgradient of Φ at (x,ȳ), and ∇ x 1 Φ(x;ȳ) is compatible with this subgradient:
Similarly, if Φ(x; y) is differentiable in y at y =ȳ, then the partial gradient ∇ y Φ(x;ȳ) is a regular supergradient of Φ at (x,ȳ), and ∇ y 1 Φ(x;ȳ) is compatible with this supergradient.
Lemma 2. In the situation of section 2.1, letz = (x = [x 1 ;x 2 ],ȳ = [ȳ 1 ;ȳ 2 ]) ∈ S, let G be a regular subgradient of Φ atz and let g be compatible with G. Let also H be a regular supergradient of Φ atz, and h be compatible with H. Then g is a subgradient in x 1 , taken at (x 1 ,ȳ 1 ) along X 1 , of the induced function φ, and h is a supergradient in y 1 , taken at (x 1 ,ȳ 1 ) along Y 1 , of the induced function φ:
Regular sub-and supergradient fields of induced functions. In the sequel, we say that φ ′ x 1 (x 1 , y 1 ), φ ′ y 1 (x 1 , y 1 ) are regular sub-and supergradient fields of φ, if for every (x 1 , y 1 ) ∈ X 1 × Y 1 and properly selectedx 2 ,ȳ 2 such that the pointz = (x = [x 1 ;x 2 ],ȳ = [y 1 ;ȳ 2 ]) is on the SP frontier of Φ, φ ′ x 1 (x 1 , y 1 ), φ ′ y 1 (x 1 , y 1 ) are the sub-and supergradients of φ induced, via Lemma 2, by regular sub-and supergradients of Φ atz. Invoking Remark 1, we arrive at the following observation:
, meaning that we are in the direct product case. If Φ is differentiable in x and in y, then regular sub-and supergradient fields of φ can be built as follows: given (x 1 , y 1 ) ∈ X 1 × Y 1 , we findx 2 ,ȳ 2 such that the pointz = (x = [x 1 ;x 2 ],ȳ = [y 1 ;ȳ 2 ]) is on the SP frontier of Φ, and set
Existence of regular sub-and supergradients
The notion of regular subgradient deals with Φ as a function of [x 1 ; x 2 ] ∈ X only, the y-argument being fixed, so that the existence/description questions related to regular subgradient deal in fact with a Lipschitz continuous convex function on X. And of course the questions about existence/description of regular supergradients reduce straightforwardly to existence/decription of regular subgradients (by swapping the roles of x's and y's and passing from Φ to −Φ). Thus, as far as existence and description of regular sub-and supergradients is concerned, it suffices to consider the situation where
is a Lipschitz continuous convex function on X,
What we need to understand, is when a subgradient G of Ψ taken atx = [x 1 ;x 2 ] along X and some g satisfy the relation
and what can be said about the corresponding g's. The answer is as follows:
Lemma 3. With Ψ,x 1 ,x 2 as above, G ∈ ∂Ψ(x) satisfies (5) if and only if the following two properties hold:
(ii) g is a subgradient, taken atx 1 along X 1 , of the convex function
It is easily seen that with Ψ,x = [x 1 ;x 2 ] as in Lemma 3 (i.e., Ψ is convex and Lipschitz continuous on X,
) a certifying subgradient G always exists; when Ψ is differentiable atx, one can take G = ∇ x Ψ(x). The function χ G (·), however, not necessary admits a subgradient atx 1 ; when it does admit it, every g ∈ ∂χ G (x 1 ), satisfies (5). In particular,
whence χ G (x 1 ) = g, x 1 + h,x 2 , and thus g is a subgradient of χ G atx 1 . In particular, in the direct product case and when Ψ is differentiable atx, (5) is met by We start with outlining some simple concepts originating from [19] . Let W be a convex compact set in Euclidean space W, and M (w) : W → W be a vector field on W . A t-step execution protocol associated with M, W is a collection I t = {w i ∈ W, M (w i ) : 1 ≤ i ≤ t}. A t-step accuracy certificate is a t-dimensional probabilistic (i.e., with nonnegative entries summing up to 1) vector λ. Augmenting a t-step accuracy protocol I t by t-step accuracy certificate λ gives rise to two entities:
When W = U × V , where U is a closed convex subset of Euclidean space U and V is a closed convex subset of Euclidean space V, and M is vector field induced by convex-concave function θ(u, v) :
(such a field always is monotone), an execution protocol associated with (M, W ) will be called also protocol associated with θ, U , V , or protocol associated with the saddle point problem
The importance of these notions in our context stems from the following simple observation [19] :
U × V → R be a convex-concave function, and M be induced monotone vector field:
associated with θ, U, V , and t-step accuracy certificate λ, it holds
Indeed, for [u; v] ∈ U × V we have
, where the inequalities are due to the origin of M and convexity-concavity of θ. The resulting inequality holds true for all [u; v] ∈ U × V , and (7) follows.
Main Result
Proposition 2. In the situation and notation of sections 2.1 -2.3, let φ be the primal convex-concave function induced by Φ, and let
be an execution protocol associated with φ, X 1 , Y 1 , where φ ′ x 1 , φ ′ y 1 are regular sub-and supergradient fields associated with Φ, φ. Due to the origin of φ, φ ′
implying that
is an execution protocol associated with Φ, X, Y . For every accuracy certificate λ it holds
As a result, given an accuracy certificate λ and setting
we ensure that
whence also, by Lemma 1,
where ψ is the dual function induced by Φ.
and (9) follows.
Application: Solving bilinear Saddle Point problems on domains represented by Linear Minimization Oracles
Situation
Let W be a nonempty convex compact set in R N , Z be a nonempty convex compact set in R M , and let ψ : W × Z → R be bilinear convex-concave function:
Our goal is to solve the convex-concave SP problem
given by ψ, W , Z.
Simple observation
We intend to show that ψ can be represented (in fact, in many ways) as the dual function induced by a bilinear convex-concave function Φ; this is the key element of the outlined in section 2.2 strategy for solving (13) .
In the situation described in section 2.5.1, let U ⊂ R n , V ⊂ R m be convex compact sets, and let D ∈ R m×N , A ∈ R n×M , R ∈ R m×n . Consider bilinear (and thus convex-concave) function
(the "convex" argument is (u, w), the "concave" one is (v, z)). Assume that a pair of functions
Thus,
We have proved Lemma 4. In the case of (15), (16) , assuming that
ψ is the dual convex-concave function induced by Φ and the domains U × W , V × Z.
Note that there are easy ways to ensure (16) and (18). (15), (16) and (18).
u(w, z) = Dw,v(w, z) = Az and assuming that U ⊃ DW , V ⊃ AZ, we again ensure (15) , (16) and (18).
Implications
Assume that (15) , (16) and (18) take place. Renaming the variables according to
we find ourselves in the direct product case of the situation of section 2.1, and Lemma 4 says that the bilinear SP problem of interest (12), (13) is the dual SP problem associated with the bilinear master SP problem
Since Φ is linear in [w; z], the primal SP problem associated with (19) is
Assuming that W , Z allow for cheap Linear Minimization Oracles and defining w * (·), z * (·) according to
we have
that is, first order information on the primal SP problem
is available. Note that since we are in the direct product case, φ ′ u and φ ′ v are regular sub-and supergradient fields associated with Φ, φ.
1 ≤ i ≤ t} be an execution protocol generated by a First Order algorithm as applied to the primal SP problem (21) , and let
is an execution protocol associated with the SP problem (19) . By Proposition 2, for any accuracy certificate λ it holds
whence, setting
[[uand invoking Proposition 1 with Φ in the role of θ,
whence, by Lemma 1,
We have arrived at the following Proposition 3. In the situation of section 2.5.1, let (15), (16) and (18) take place. Then applying to the primal SP problem (21) First Order algorithm B with accuracy certificates, t-step execution protocol I t and accuracy certificate λ t generated by B yield straightforwardly a feasible solution to the SP problem of interest (12) - (13) of the ǫ sad -inaccuracy ≤ Res(I t , λ t |U × V ).
Note also that when the constructions from Examples 1, 2 are used, there is a significant freedom in selecting the domain U × V of the primal problem (we only require U , V to be convex compact sets "large enough" to ensure the inclusions mentioned in Examples), so that there is no difficulty to enforce U , V to be proximal friendly. As a result, we can take as B a proximal First Order method, for example, Non-Euclidean Restricted Memory Level algorithm with certificates (cf. [4] ) or Mirror Descent (cf. [17] ). The efficiency estimates of these algorithms as given in [4, 17] imply that the resulting procedure for solving the SP of interest (12) - (13) admits non-asymptotic O(1/ √ t) rate of convergence, with explicitly computable factors hidden in O(·). The resulting complexity bound is completely similar to the one achievable with the machinery of Fenchel-type representations [4, 17] .
We are about to consider a special case where the O(1/ √ t) complexity admits a significant improvement.
Matrix Game case
Our goal is to solve matrix game min
Let U , V be convex compact sets such that
and let us set
It is immediately seen that the function ψ from (26) is nothing but the dual convex-concave function associated with Φ (cf. Example 2), while the primal function is
here Min(p) and Max(p) stand for the smallest and the largest entries in vector p. Applying the strategy outlined in section 2.2, we can solve the problem of interest (26) applying to the primal SP problem min
an algorithm with accuracy certificates and using the machinery outlined in previous sections to convert the resulting execution protocols and certificates into approximate solutions to the problem of interest (26). We intend to consider a special case when the outlined approach allows to reduce a huge, but simple, matrix game (26) to a small SP problem (29) -so small that it can be solved to high accuracy by a cutting plane method (e.g., the Ellipsoid algorithm). This is the case when the matrices A, D in (26) are simple.
Simple matrices
Given a K × L matrix B, we call B simple if, given x ∈ R K , it is easy to identify the columns B[x], B[x] of B making the maximal, resp. the minimal, inner product with x.
When matrices A, D in (26) are simple, the first order information for the cost function φ in the primal SP problem (29) is easy to get. Besides, all we need from the convex compact sets U , V participating in (29) is to be large enough to ensure that U ⊃ DW and V ⊃ AZ, which allows to make U and V simple, e.g., Euclidean balls. Finally, when the design dimension 2K of (29) is small, we have at our disposal a multitude of linearly converging, with the converging ratio depending solely on K, methods for solving (29), including the Ellipsoid algorithm with certificates presented in [19] . We are about to demonstrate that the outlined situation indeed takes place in some meaningful applications.
Example: Knapsack generated matrices
2 Assume that we are given knapsack data, namely,
• positive integer horizon m,
• positive integer costs h s , 1 ≤ s ≤ m, and positive integer budget H, and
Given the outlined data, consider the set P of all integer vectors p = [p 1 ; ...; p m ] ∈ R m satisfying the following restrictions:
and the matrix B of the size K × Card(P), K = m s=1 r s , defined as follows: the columns of B are indexed by vectors p = [p 1 ; ...; p s ] ∈ P, and the column indexed by p is the vector
2 The construction to follow can be easily extended from "knapsack generated" matrices to more general "Dynamic Programming generated" ones, see section A.4 in Appendix.
Note that assuming m, p s , r s moderate, matrix B is simple -given x ∈ R K , it is easy to find B 
with U m+1 (·) ≡ 0, and then to recover one by one the entries p s in the index p ∈ P of B[x] from the forward Bellman recurrence
2.6.3 Illustration: Attacker vs. Defender.
The "covering story" we intend to consider is as follows 3 with given (a s + 1) × (d s + 1) matrices Ω s . Our goal is to solve in mixed strategies the matrix game where Defender seeks to minimize his total loss, and Attacker seeks to maximize it. Denoting by A and D the sets of pure strategies of Attacker, resp., Defender, representing 
we end up with K × M , M = Card(A), knapsack-generated matrix A with columns A a , a ∈ A, and K × N , N = Card(D), knapsack-generated matrix D with columns
As a result, solving the Attacker vs. Defender game in mixed strategies reduces to solving SP problem (26) with knapsack-generated (and thus simple) matrices A, D and thus can be reduced to convexconcave SP (29) on the product of two K-dimensional convex compact sets. Note that in the situation in question the design dimension 2K of (29) will, typically, be rather small (few tens or at most few hundreds), while the design dimensions M , N of the matrix game of interest (26) and thus (29) can be easily solved to high accuracy by the Ellipsoid method. In the numerical experiment we are about to report 4 , the outlined approach allowed to solve (26) within ǫ sad -inaccuracy as small as 5.0e-9 in just 1537 steps of the Ellipsoid algorithm (110.0 sec on a medium quality laptop). This performance is quite promising, especially when taking into account huge -nearly 10 11 -sizes of the matrix game of interest (26).
From Saddle Point problems to Variational Inequalities with Monotone Operators
In what follows, we extend the decomposition approach (developed so far for convex-concave SP problems) to Variational Inequalities (VI's) with monotone operators, with the primary goal to handle VI's with affine monotone operators on LMO-represented domains.
Decomposition of Variational Inequalities with monotone operators
Situation
Let X , H be Euclidean spaces, Θ ⊂ X × H be convex compact set, Ξ be the projection of Θ onto X , and H be the projection of Θ onto H. Given ξ ∈ Ξ, η ∈ H, we set
We denote a point from X × H as θ = [ξ; η] with ξ ∈ X , η ∈ H. Let, further,
be a continuous monotone vector field.
Induced vector fields
Let ξ ∈ Ξ, and let η = η(ξ) be a somehow selected, as a function of ξ ∈ Ξ, strong solution to the VI given by (H ξ , Φ η (ξ, η)), that is,
Let us call Φ (more precisely, the pair (Φ, η(·))) η-regular, if for every ξ ∈ Ξ, there exists Ψ = Ψ(ξ) ∈ X such that Ψ(ξ),
Similarly, let ξ(η) be a somehow selected, as a function of η ∈ H, strong solution to the VI given by
Let us call (Φ, ξ(·)) ξ-regular, if for every η ∈ H there exists Γ = Γ(η) ∈ H such that
When (Φ, η) is η-regular, we refer to the above Ψ(·) as to a primal vector field induced by Φ 5 , and when (Φ, ξ) is ξ-regular, we refer to the above Γ(·) as to a dual vector field induced by Φ.
Example: Direct product case. This is the case where Θ = Ξ × H. In this situation, setting
that is, (Φ, ξ(·)) is ξ-regular, with Γ(η) = Φ η (ξ(η), η).
Main Result, Variational Inequality case
Preliminaries
Recall that the (Minty's) variational inequality VI(M, W ) associated with a convex compact subset W of Euclidean space W and a vector field M : W → W is
w satisfying the latter condition is called a weak solution to the VI. A natural measure of inaccuracy for an approximate solution w ∈ W to VI(M, W ) is the dual gap function
weak solutions to the VI are exactly the points of W where this (clearly nonnegative everywhere on W ) function is zero.
In the sequel we utilize the following simple fact originating from [19] :
Proposition 4. Let M be monotone on W , let I t = {w i ∈ W, M (w i ) : 1 ≤ i ≤ t} be a t-step execution protocol associated with (M, W ), λ be a t-step accuracy certificate, and w t = t i=1 λ i w i be the associated approximate solution. Then
Indeed, we have
Main result
Proposition 5. In the situation of section 3.1.1, let (Φ, η(·)) be η-regular. Then (i) Primal vector field Ψ(ξ) induced by (Φ, η(·)) is monotone on Ξ. Moreover, whenever I t = {ξ i ∈ Ξ, Ψ(ξ i ) : 1 ≤ i ≤ t} and J t = {θ i := [ξ i ; η(ξ i )], Φ(θ i ) : 1 ≤ i ≤ t} and λ is a t-step accuracy certificate, it holds
(ii) Let (Φ, ξ) be ξ-regular, and let Γ be the induced dual vector field. Whenever θ = [ ξ; η] ∈ Θ, we have
Implications
In the situation of section 3.1.1, assume that for properly selected η(·), ξ(·), (Φ, η(·)) is η-regular, and (Φ, ξ(·)) is ξ-regular, induced primal and dual vector fields being Ψ and Γ. In order to solve the dual VI VI(Γ, H), we can apply to the primal VI VI(Ψ, Ξ) an algorithm with accuracy certificates; by Proposition 5.i, resulting t-step execution protocol I t = {ξ i , Ψ(ξ i ) : 1 ≤ i ≤ t} and accuracy certificate λ generate an execution protocol
whence, by Proposition 4, for the approximate solution
it holds ǫ VI (θ t |Φ, Θ) ≤ Res(I t , λ|Ξ).
Invoking Proposition 5.ii, we conclude that η t is a feasible solution to the dual VI VI(Γ, H), and
We are about to present two examples well suited for the just outlined approach.
Solving affine monotone VI on LMO-represented domain
Let H be a convex compact set in H = R N , and let H be equipped with an LMO. Assume that we want to solve the VI VI(F, H), where
is an affine monotone operator (so that S + S T 0). Let us set X = H, select Ξ as a proximal-friendly convex compact set containing H, and set Θ = Ξ × H,
We have
so that Φ is an affine monotone operator with
Setting ξ(η) = η, we ensure that ξ(η) ∈ Ξ when η ∈ H and Φ ξ (ξ(η), η) = 0, implying (32). Since we are in the direct product case, we can set Γ(η) = Φ η (ξ(η), η) = Sη + s = F (η); thus, VI(Γ, H) is our initial VI of interest. On the other hand, setting
we ensure (30). Since we are in the direct product case, we can set
note that the values of Ψ can be straightforwardly computed via calls to the LMO representing H. We can now solve VI(Ψ, Ξ) by a proximal algorithm B with accuracy certificates and recover, as explained above, approximate solution to the VI of interest VI(F, H). With the Non-Euclidean Restricted Memory Level method with certificates [4] or Mirror Descent with certificates (see, e.g., [17] ), the approach results in non-asymptotical O(1/ √ t)-converging algorithm for solving the VI of interest, with explicitly computable factors hidden in O(·). This complexity bound, completely similar to the one obtained in [17] , seems to be the best known under the circumstances.
Solving skew-symmetric VI on LMO-represented domain
Let H be an LMO-represented convex compact domain in H = R N , and assume that we want to solve VI(F, H), where
with K × N matrices P, Q such that the matrix Q T P is skew-symmetric:
Let us set Ξ = Ξ 1 × Ξ 2 , and let
Note that Φ is monotone and affine. Setting
and invoking (38), we ensure (32); since we are in the direct product case, we can take, as the dual induced vector field,
so that the dual VI VI(Γ, H) is our VI of interest.
On the other hand, setting
we ensure (30). Since we are in the direct product case, we can define primal vector field as
Note that LMO for H allows to compute the values of Ψ, and that Ξ can be selected to be proximalfriendly. We can now solve VI(Ψ, Ξ) by a proximal algorithm B with accuracy certificates and recover, as explained above, approximate solution to the VI of interest VI(F, H). When the design dimension dim Ξ of the primal VI is small, other choices of B, like the Ellipsoid algorithm, are possible, and in this case we can end up with linearly converging, with the converging ratio depending solely on dim Ξ, algorithm for solving the VI of interest. We are about to give a related example, which can be considered as multi-player version of the "Attacker vs. Defender" game.
Example: Nash Equilibrium with pairwise interactions. Consider the situation as follows: there are
• L ≥ 2 players, ℓ-th of them selecting a mixed strategy w ℓ from probabilistic simplex ∆ N ℓ of dimension N ℓ ,
• encoding matrices D ℓ of sizes m ℓ × N ℓ , and loss matrices M ℓℓ ′ of sizes m ℓ × m ℓ ′ such that
• The loss of ℓ-th player depends on mixed strategies of the players according to
In other words, every pair of distinct players ℓ, ℓ ′ are playing matrix game with matrix M ℓℓ ′ , and the loss of player ℓ, up to a linear in [w 1 ; ...; w L ] function, is the sum, over the pairwise games he is playing, of his losses in these games, the "coupling constraints" being expressed by the requirement that every player uses the same mixed strategy in all pairwise games he is playing.
We have described convex Nash Equilibrium problem, meaning that for every ℓ,
, and
is the linear function g, η , g = ℓ g ℓ , and thus is convex. It is known (see, e.g., [19] ) that Nash Equilibria in convex Nash problem are exactly the weak solutions to the VI given by monotone operator
on the domain
Let us set
Besides this, we clearly have
Observe that if D 1 , ..., D L are simple, so are Q and P .
Indeed, for Q this is evident: to find the column of Q which makes the largest inner product with x = [x 1 ; ...; x L ], dim x ℓ = m ℓ , it suffices to find, for every ℓ, the column of D ℓ which makes the maximal inner product with x ℓ , and then to select the maximal of the resulting L inner products and the corresponding to this maximum column of Q. To maximize the inner product of the same x with columns of P , note that
so that to maximize the inner product of x and the columns of P means to find, for every ℓ, the column of D ℓ which makes the maximal inner product with y ℓ , and then to select the maximal of the resulting L inner products and the corresponding to this maximum column of P .
We see that if D ℓ are simple, we can use the approach from section 3.2.2 to approximate the solution to the VI generated by F on H. Note that in the case in question the dual gap function ǫ VI (η|F, H) admits a transparent interpretation in terms of the Nash Equilibrium problem we are solving: for η = [w 1 ; ...; w L ] ∈ H, we have
and the right hand side here is the sum, over the players, of the (nonnegative) incentives for a player ℓ to deviate from his strategy w ℓ to another mixed strategy when all other players stick to their strategies as given by η. Thus, small ǫ VI ([w 1 ; ...; w L ]|·, ·) means small incentives for the players to deviate from mixed strategies w ℓ .
Verification of (39) is immediate: denoting f ℓ = ∇ w ℓ g ℓ , w , by definition of ǫ VI we have for every
and (39) follows.
Relation to [17]
Here we demonstrate that the decomposition approach to solving VI's with monotone operators on LMO-represented domains cover the approach, based on Fenchel-type representations, developed in [17] . Specifically, let H be a compact convex set in Euclidean space H = R N , G(·) be a monotone vector field on H, and η → Ax + a be an affine mapping from H to Euclidean space X = R M . Given a convex compact set Ξ ⊂ X , let us set
so that Φ clearly is a monotone vector field on Θ. Assume that η(ξ) : Ξ → H is a somehow selected strong solution to VI(Φ η (ξ, ·), H):
(cf. (30)); note that required η(ξ) definitely exists, provided that G(·) is continuous and monotone. Let us also define ξ(η) as a selection of the point-to-set mapping η → Argmin ξ∈Ξ Aη + a, ξ , so that
(cf. (32)).
Observe that with the just defined Ξ, H, Θ, Φ, η(·), ξ(·) we are in the direct product case of the situation described in section 3.1.1. Since we are in the direct product case, (Φ, η(·)) is η-regular, and we can take, as the induced primal vector field associated with (Φ, η(·)), the vector field
and as the induced dual vector field, the field
Note that in terms of [17] , relations (43) and (41), modulo notation, form what in the reference is called a Fenchel-type representation (F.-t.r.) of vector field Ψ : Ξ → X , the data of the representation being H, A, a, η(·), G(·), H. On a closer inspection, every F.-t.r. of a given monotone vector field Ψ : Ξ → X can be obtained in this fashion from some setup of the form (40).
Assume now that Ξ is LMO-representable, and we have at our disposal G-oracle which, given on input η ∈ H, returns G(η). This oracle combines with LMO for Ξ to induce a procedure which, given on input η ∈ H, returns Γ(η). As a result, we can apply the decomposition machinery presented in sections 3.1, 3.2 to reduce solving VI(Ψ, Ξ) to processing VI(Γ, H) by an algorithm with accuracy certificates. It can be easily seen by inspection that this reduction recovers constructions and results presented in [17, sections 1 -4] . The bottom line is that the developed in sections 3.1, 3.2 decomposition-based approach to solving VI's with monotone operators on LMO-represented domains essentially covers the developed in [17] approach based on Fenchel-type representations of monotone vector fields 6 .
[23] Tewari, A., Ravikumar, P. K., Dhillon, I. S. "Greedy algorithms for structurally constrained high dimensional problems" -in: J. Φ(x 1 , x 2 ; y 1 , y 2 ) is convex and Lipschitz con-
θ(x 1 , x 2 ; y 1 ) is convex and lower semicontinuous in x 1 ∈ X 1 (note that X is compact). On the other hand, φ(
χ(x 1 ; y 1 , y 2 ) := min
is concave and Lipschitz continuous in y = [y 1 ; y 2 ] ∈ Y for every x 1 ∈ X 1 , whence
is concave and upper semicontinuous in y 1 ∈ Y 1 (note that Y is compact). Next, we have SadVal(φ, X 1 , X 2 ) = inf
= inf
We conclude that
as claimed in (3).
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
For x 1 ∈ X 1 we have φ(x 1 ;ȳ 1 ) = min
≥ min
as claimed in (a). "Symmetric" reasoning justifies (b).
A.3 Proof of Lemma 3
Assume that (5) holds true. Then G clearly is certifying, implying that
and therefore (5) reads
where, taking minimum in the left hand side over 
A.4 Dynamic Programming generated simple matrices
Consider the situation as follows. There exists an evolving in time system S, with state ξ s at time s = 1, 2, ..., m belonging to a given finite nonempty set Ξ s . Further, every pair (ξ, s) with s ∈ {1, ..., m}, ξ ∈ Ξ s is associated with nonempty finite set of actions A s ξ , and we set S s = {(ξ, a) : ξ ∈ Ξ s , a ∈ A s ξ }.
Further, for every s, 1 ≤ s < m, a transition mapping π s (ξ, a) : S s → Ξ s+1 is given. Finally, we are given vector-valued functions ("outputs") χ s : S s → R rs . A trajectory of S is a sequence {(ξ s , a s ) : 1 ≤ s ≤ m} such that (ξ s , a s ) ∈ S s for 1 ≤ s ≤ m and ξ s+1 = π s (ξ s , a s ), 1 ≤ s < m.
The output of a trajectory τ = {(ξ s , a s ) : 1 ≤ s ≤ m} is the block-vector For example, knapsack generated matrix D associated with knapsack data from section 2.6.2 is of the form D[S] with system S as follows:
• Ξ s , s = 1, ..., m, is the set of nonnegative integers which are ≤ H;
• A s ξ is the set of nonnegative integers a such that a ≤p s and ξ − h s p s ≥ 0; • the transition mappings are π s (ξ, a) = ξ − ah s ;
• the outputs are χ s (ξ, a) = f s (a), 1 ≤ s ≤ m.
In the notation from section 2.6.2, vectors [p 1 ; ...; p m ] ∈ P are exactly the sequences of actions a 1 , ..., a m stemming from the trajectories of the just defined system S. In our implementation, this problem was solved from time to time, specifically, once per 4K 2 steps. Note that with U , V being Euclidean balls, (46) is well within the scope of Matlab Convex Programming solver CVX [12] .
• Second, given current approximate solution (45) to the problem of interest, we can compute its saddle point inaccuracy exactly instead of upper-bounding it by Res(I τ , λ τ |U × V ). Indeed, it is immediately seen that
In our implementation, we performed this computation each time when a new accuracy certificate was computed, and terminated the solution process when the saddle point inaccuracy became less than a given threshold (1.e-4).
A.6 Proof of Proposition 5 
